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43 
THE REGULATION OF LABOR AND THE 
RELEVANCE OF LEGAL ORIGIN 
David E. Pozen† 
Arguably the most important social science research of the past 
decade has centered on comparative law and economics.  In a 
celebrated series of articles, the economists Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and intermittent 
collaborators have explored empirically how a country’s legal origin—
English common law, French civil law, Germanic code, Scandinavian 
law, or Soviet socialist law—affects its subsequent institutional and 
economic development.  The common law emerges as the hero of this 
analysis:  Compared with other countries and especially with civil law 
countries, common law bearers have, ceteris paribus, better legal 
protection of shareholders and creditors;1 greater judicial 
independence and economic freedom;2 less formalized, shorter, fairer, 
more consistent dispute resolution procedures;3 less politicized law 
enforcement;4 lower barriers to new business formation;5 and more 
efficient bureaucracies.6  Taken together, these studies offer a 
remarkably broad argument for the common law being a driver of, or 
at least uniquely consonant with, good government.  On the sweep 
and strength of these findings, La Porta and colleagues have been 
cited more times since 1997 than any other economists, and 
policymakers worldwide have been scouring their articles for usable 
insights.7 
 
 †  J.D., Yale Law School, expected 2007.  I thank Patrick Bayer, John Donohue, Joshua 
Kleinfeld, David Love, Michelle Messer, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
 1. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La 
Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 
52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants]. 
 2. Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004). 
 3. Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q. J. ECON. 453 (2003). 
 4. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1193 (2002). 
 5. Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2002). 
 6. Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999). 
 7. See Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 46 
(profiling the authors, often referred to collectively as “LLSV,” and describing their impact).  
LLSV’s law-and-finance scholarship has been particularly influential.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, 
Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership:  The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of 
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=900160
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In a new study entitled The Regulation of Labor, the authors 
(with Juan Botero now headlining) push their research in a 
provocative new direction.8  While their previous work had focused on 
corporate law and on courts, here the authors investigate a novel 
domain.  Using original data compiled on eighty-five countries, 
Botero and colleagues (Botero et al.) examine the historical 
determinants of employment, collective relations, and social security 
laws.  They find that legal origin is a stronger predictor of all of these 
than political or economic variables, with common law associated with 
the lowest levels of regulation.  Legal institutional theory, they 
conclude, better explains the development of national labor laws than 
political power or efficiency theories. 
Moving labor market regulation from the left-hand to the right-
hand side of the equation, Botero et al. then show that heavier 
regulation corresponds to lower labor force participation and higher 
unemployment, especially for the young.  Coupled with the legal 
origins evidence, this result implies that the common law leads not 
only to less intensive worker protection, but also to superior labor 
market outcomes.  The Regulation of Labor thus extends La Porta 
and colleagues’ research in at least three significant ways, providing 
further evidence of:  (1) legal origin’s lasting and profound impact on 
present-day outcomes, (2) the common law’s uniquely beneficent 
effects, and (3) “regulatory complementarity,” whereby countries’ 
regulatory styles remain consistent across substantive areas of law.9  
The study’s remarkable dataset and its anti-regulation conclusions, 
meanwhile, may set the agenda for comparative labor law empirical 
research for years to come.10 
The problem, this paper will argue, is that The Regulation of 
Labor’s methodological weaknesses severely undermine its putative 
contributions.  Many scholars have voiced concerns about La Porta 
 
Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.2 (2001) (calling LLSV’s law-and-finance works 
“seminal”); Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and 
Continental Europe:  Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 699 (2005) (same); Beth 
Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin:  A 
Case of Institutional Complementarity? 2 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working 
Paper No. 72/2006, 2005) (noting that LLSV’s research has “inform[ed] the policy and working 
methods of the World Bank and other international financial institutions”). 
 8. Juan C. Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1339 (2004). 
 9. This phrase comes from Shleifer himself.  Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 
Conscription as Regulation, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 85, 87 (2005). 
 10. For examples of recent works that draw on Botero et al.’s data, see W.S. Siebert, 
Labour Market Regulation:  Some Comparative Lessons, 25 ECON. AFF. 3 (Sept. 2005); Ahlering 
& Deakin, supra note 7; Davin Chor & Richard B. Freeman, The 2004 Global Labor Survey:  
Workplace Institutions and Practices Around the World (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11598, 2005). 
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and colleagues’ econometric approach.11  I join this chorus and seek to 
augment it by providing, in Sections I and II, one of the first 
systematic methodological critiques of their study12 and by situating 
this critique, in Section III, in the broader context of empirical legal 
scholarship.  My critique is able to avoid being highly technical 
because the methodological problems here are fundamental.  
Nevertheless, I write this paper not from a place of ressentiment, but 
from a place of admiration; The Regulation of Labor, like all of these 
authors’ works, is as impressive as it is important.  More, it is a signal 
example of the intertwined potentialities and problematics of 
comparative law and economics. 
I. MEASUREMENT AND CODING 
To be able to write The Regulation of Labor, Botero et al. 
undertook a Herculean effort in creating their dataset.  In addition to 
culling a variety of political, economic, and legal variables from 
preexisting sources—the legal origins classification scheme is carried 
over from the authors’ previous articles—Botero et al. quantified for 
the first time the labor laws of eighty-five countries across more than 
sixty dimensions.  The authors group each labor-law variable (e.g., 
percentage of net salary covered by sickness benefits for a two-month 
sickness spell) into a sub-index (e.g., sickness and health benefits), and 
then group each sub-index into one of three indices (employment 
laws, collective relations laws, or social security laws) meant to 
summarize the overall stringency of a country’s regulations.13  All 
variables are normalized to values between zero and one; the sub-
index values are computed as the mean of the sub-index’s variables; 
and the index values are computed as the mean of the index’s sub-
 
 11. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 46 (summarizing the concerns).  The bulk of the 
methodological criticisms have targeted LLSV’s law-and-finance research, see, e.g., Thorsten 
Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development 16–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 10126, 2003), and so are only partially apposite here. 
 12. This appears to be the first commentary devoted wholly to The Regulation of Labor.  I 
am aware of two other papers that offer sustained critiques:  Beth Ahlering and Simon Deakin 
examine the validity of Botero et al.’s labor law measures and argue that the study, like the rest 
of “the legal origin literature[,] relies upon an overly reductive understanding of the common 
law/civil law divide,” Ahlering & Deakin, supra note 7, at 43, while Davin Chor and Richard 
Freeman compare the results obtained from their Global Labor Survey with the Botero et al. 
indices, Chor & Freeman, supra note 10.  Both of these critiques are stimulating and valuable, 
and provide deeper analysis of measurement issues than I do here.  My aim in this paper is to 
point out some additional reasons for skepticism about The Regulation of Labor’s design and 
results. 
 13. The article itself spends nineteen pages explaining the data, Botero et al., supra note 8, 
at 1346–64, and the dataset is downloadable from Andrei Shleifer’s Web page, 
http://www.andrei-shleifer.com/data.html. 
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indices.  These variables reflect formal legal rules—labor law 
statutes—as they apply to a standardized male worker and a 
standardized employer.14  They are coded such that higher values 
correspond to more extensive worker protection, with 1.00 indicating 
maximal protection.  Except for a few civil rights measures derived 
from U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of Labor, and 
International Labor Organization reports, the authors themselves 
created and coded all of their dependent variables. 
For their independent variables, the authors cull from a variety of 
data sources.  Their preferred political orientation variables, for 
example, draw on multiple compendia to record the fraction of years 
during 1928–1995 and 1975–1995 when a country’s chief executive and 
its legislature were both of “leftist” or “centrist” orientation.15  (What 
it means to be leftist or centrist, or how this was calculated, is never 
explained, in the text or the data appendix.)  Other independent 
variables measure for each country:  1997 per capita income; average 
years of schooling for the population over twenty-five years of age; 
union density; average levels of autocracy and democracy between 
1950 and the 1990s; and the degree to which governments were 
divided and proportionally representative from 1975 to 1995. 
I provide this sketch of Botero et al.’s data because they are at 
once the major strength and the major weakness of the paper.  They 
are the major strength for obvious reasons:  By quantifying so many 
aspects of so many countries’ labor laws, the data enable an empirical 
analysis of worker protections that is by far the most comprehensive 
on record.16  The cost of this great breadth, however, is a loss of 
confidence that the data actually represent what they are supposed to.  
 
 14. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1346, 1353.  Among other qualities, the standardized 
worker is married with two children, lives in the country’s most populous city, is not a member of 
a voluntary labor union, and belongs to the majority race and religion; while the standardized 
employer is a domestically-owned manufacturing company located in the country’s most 
populous city, has 250 workers, and offers workers no more protections than what is legally 
mandated.  Id. at 1353 n.6. 
 15. Data sources for these two variables include World Bank reports, political 
encyclopedias, online databases, and unspecified “various regional and country sources.”  Data 
Appendix, Variable Definitions, available at http://www.andrei-shleifer.com/data.html. 
 16. Compare Botero et al., supra note 8, with Giuseppe Nicoletti & Frederic L. Pryor, 
Subjective and Objective Measures of the Extent of Governmental Regulations (AEI-Brookings 
Joint Ctr., 2001) (reviewing three recent quantitative studies measuring the extent of regulation 
in OECD countries).  The Global Labor Survey dataset is similarly ambitious in scope, see Chor 
& Freeman, supra note 10, but its variables tend to be more opinionative and impressionistic, 
they cover only thirty-three countries, and they have not yet, as far as I know, been subjected to 
the same sort of econometric analysis.  The 1994 OECD Jobs Study and follow-on reports have 
analyzed the economic impact of labor market regulations at great depth, but only for a much 
narrower set of regulations.  See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD JOBS STUDY:  EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS: PART 1: LABOUR 
MARKET TRENDS AND UNDERLYING FORCES OF CHANGE (1994). 
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Validity slippage could occur on several levels—and mar the study’s 
results twice over, because labor regulation is used as both a 
dependent and independent variable.17  First, Botero et al.’s exclusive 
reliance on formal legal rules might fail to capture functional 
outcomes.  Botero et al. acknowledge this evident concern and take 
some steps to mitigate it, but they overlook the possibility that 
enforcement of and compliance with labor laws vary systematically 
across countries.18  For example, compliance and enforcement rates 
may be positively correlated with, and to some extent caused by, the 
wealth and institutional maturity of a jurisdiction, the longevity of a 
law’s existence, and the degree of a law’s compatibility with social 
norms—all of which are likely to be lower for developing countries as 
compared to developed countries with respect to labor regulations.  
Compliance will also likely be weaker in the presence of strict 
regulation.19  Validity is further attenuated by Botero et al.’s failure to 
distinguish between mandatory, default, and optional rules—
presumably they coded for default rules—which both magnifies the de 
jure/de facto cleavage and leaves their variables underspecified.20 
The Regulation of Labor’s coding scheme exacerbates a second 
and even more basic concern:  the inherent subjectivity in translating 
statutory provisions (not to mention functional outcomes) into 
numerical scores.  It is easy to dispute, for instance, a “dismissal 
procedures” sub-index that gives New Zealand a score of 0.14 and 
 
 17. Botero et al., supra note 8, at tbls.2-5, tbl.8. 
 18. Botero et al. find this concern minor because they include some rough controls for 
enforcement quality, because labor law is primarily statute-based (a claim challenged in 
Ahlering & Deakin, supra note 7, at 17), and because several of the sub-indices are constructed 
to reflect actual economic costs, not just statutory language.  Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1347.  
It should be noted that economists, including labor economists, routinely measure enforcement 
levels.  See, e.g., Rita Almeida & Pedro Carneiro, Enforcement of Labor Regulation, Informal 
Labor, and Firm Performance (World Bank, Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 3756, 2005) 
(measuring labor-law enforcement in Brazil). 
  Chor and Freeman’s Global Labor Survey, “an Internet-based survey designed to 
collect information on the state of workplace practices from labor experts and practitioners 
around the world,” Chor & Freeman, supra note 10, at 3, bypasses formal legal rules altogether 
in pursuit of functional knowledge on labor regulation.  The Global Labor Survey indices are 
consistent with the rankings of Botero et al., but the correlations are not particularly tight, 
especially in the area of collective relations.  See id. at 21 & n.24, 42 tbl.8. Chor and Freeman 
“attribute part of this to the fact that Botero et al. measure de jure labor regulations, which will 
inevitably diverge from de facto workplace practices,” and part of it to “differences in the 
component questions that underlie the two [studies’] measures.”  Id. at 21-22. 
 19. See Norman V. Loayza et al., The Impact of Regulation on Growth and Informality:  
Cross-Country Evidence (World Bank, Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 3623, 2005). 
 20. Holger Spamann and others have critiqued LLSV’s failure to distinguish between 
mandatory, default, and optional rules in their law-and-finance scholarship.  See Holger 
Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s “Anti-Director Rights 
Index” Under Consistent Coding 6-8 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law 
Sch., Discussion Paper No. 67, 2006); id. at 4 n.7 (providing further citations). 
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Portugal a score of 0.71.  Portugal may have more stringent dismissal 
procedures than New Zealand, but are its procedures really five times 
as stringent?  Because Botero et al.’s variables are unique, there is 
neither an independent check on their accuracy, nor any good way to 
quantify their measurement error.  And what does it even mean to 
have dismissal procedures that are five times as stringent as those of 
another country?  Because Botero et al. never provide a theory of 
labor regulation to undergird their coding decisions, this ratio is 
essentially arbitrary.  In multiple senses, then, The Regulation of 
Labor’s data may be subject to greater uncertainty than the labor law 
data generated through the repeated, systematic efforts of groups like 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the World Bank.21 
A third cluster of data limitations involves Botero et al.’s method 
of indexing their worker-protectiveness scores.  This indexing loses 
potentially interesting information about individual laws.  It imposes 
an awkward commensurability across a wide range of legal protections 
that influence different workers in different countries in different 
ways.  It unrealistically assumes that these protections operate 
independently of each other, such that countries do not substitute 
between, say, employment law and trade unions, and employees do 
not experience multiplicative returns on the simultaneous 
presence/absence or generosity/stinginess of different protections.22  
And its use of averages masks substantial variability within both the 
sub-indices and the indices,23 which would be especially unfortunate if 
any sub-indices correlate across countries in ways that diverge from 
their indices.24  Compounding the artificiality of the indexing method, 
 
 21. It is thus a promising development that the World Bank has apparently resolved to 
update and expand on some of Botero et al.’s formal measures in its Doing Business database.  
See World Bank, Doing Business Database, http://www.doingbusiness.org. 
 22. Sanford Jacoby contends such substitution is likely to happen.  Sanford M. Jacoby, 
Economic Ideas and the Labor Market:  Origins of the Anglo-American Model and Prospects for 
Global Diffusion, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 43, 69 n.60 (2003). 
 23. As an illustration of this concern, Greece and Argentina have aggregate social security 
index scores—used by Botero et al. as a dependent variable in all regressions—that, at 0.74 and 
0.72 respectively, are quite similar.  Their sub-index scores, however, betray significant 
differences in their social security systems:  Greece’s scores for “old age, disability and death 
benefits,” “sickness and health benefits,” and “unemployment benefits” are 0.70, 0.78, and 0.74, 
while Argentina’s comparable scores are 0.37, 0.94, and 0.84.  Data Appendix, supra note 15.  
One would never know from the countries’ index scores that Greece has a consistently generous 
social security system across all dimensions, whereas Argentina has a highly generous system 
with respect to health and unemployment benefits but a rather uncharitable system with respect 
to old age, disability, and death benefits. 
 24. Although sub-indices are generally correlated with other sub-indices from the same 
index, Botero et al., supra note 8, at tbl.II, this possibility remains.  Botero et al. helpfully include 
the sub-indices as dependent variables in Table IV, but nowhere else. 
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Botero et al.’s exclusive focus on standardized workers and employers 
elides any within-country variability that exists across industry sector, 
region, age, gender, race, marital status, and the like. 
The above data concerns are substantial, yet The Regulation of 
Labor—and arguably all of the authors’ legal origins work—is beset 
by two other data concerns still more fundamental:  the possibility of 
miscoding and a lack of transparency.  La Porta and colleagues have 
already been charged with misclassifying certain countries’ legal 
typology.25  Others have argued that “transplant” countries, which 
received their legal systems through conquest or colonization, follow 
systematically different paths of legal evolution than “origin” 
countries, irrespective of legal family.26  Still others have found 
regional patterns in legal evolution not captured by the authors’ 
framework.27  The Regulation of Labor is vulnerable to each of these 
criticisms, and also to criticisms of its worker-protection 
characterizations.  “[A] labor scholar would immediately notice that 
there might be some problem in the construction of [the study’s] 
indices,” Sanford Jacoby points out, “because the industrial relations 
regime in Canada is coded as less ‘pro-worker’ than that of the United 
States.”28  Indeed, in direct conflict with this result, the OECD 
recently gave Canada a significantly higher rating than the United 
States on overall “employment protection legislation” for each of the 
past three decades.29 
The potential for such miscoding here, it is important to stress, is 
not just a function of the inevitable messiness of quantifying complex 
real-world phenomena; it is also a function of process and subject-
matter competence.  Because Botero et al. did not use survey data or, 
for the most part, objective measures, nearly all of The Regulation of 
Labor’s data values reflect the authors’ judgment calls.  It would take 
 
 25. Mark West, for instance, has ridiculed the coding of Japan as a Germanic-code country.  
See Thompson, supra note 7, at 46. 
 26. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 
47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003) [hereinafter Berkowitz et al., Economic Development]; Daniel 
Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003) [hereinafter Berkowitz et 
al., Transplant Effect]. 
 27. See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country 
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002). 
 28. Jacoby, supra note 22, at 69 n.60.  In a similar vein, Spamann and others have argued 
that there is “strong and systematic measurement error” in LLSV’s coding of shareholder 
protection rules.  Spamann, supra note 20, at 1; accord Cools, supra note 7.  When Spamann 
recoded LLSV’s Antidirector Rights Index, this time with the help of local lawyers, nearly all of 
the results from LLSV’s famous Law and Finance paper, La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra 
note 1, ceased to be statistically significant. 
 29. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD 
EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2004, at 117 tbl.2.A2.4 (2004). 
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an astonishing facility with international labor law (and foreign 
languages) to accurately discern the worker protectiveness of sixty-
plus regulatory fields across eighty-plus countries.  Yet no one of the 
authors is a labor law scholar, much less a global authority.30  It is 
therefore particularly jarring that Botero et al. do not give readers a 
reasonable explanation of how they constructed their data or how to 
replicate their process.31  The dataset may ultimately prove as 
unreliable as it may prove invalid. 
II. OMITTED VARIABLES, AHISTORICITY, AND ENDOGENEITY 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Botero et al.’s data represent with 
perfect fidelity the state of each country’s labor regulations, 
functionally as well as formally, The Regulation of Labor would still 
not be able to generate meaningful causal conclusions on legal origins.  
As in the authors’ related work, this study’s legal origins inquiry 
proceeds from a clever insight:  Because most countries in the world 
received their legal typology by transplant and never changed it 
thereafter, their legal origins are exogenous to their economies.  This 
offers the researcher a natural experiment. 
Yet that same colonial genesis also means that a country’s legal 
typology is part of a larger socio-historical package, which creates a 
tangle of econometric problems.  First, because countries within a 
legal family tend to share so many extralegal commonalities—
historical, linguistic, geographical, cultural—all of which might 
plausibly influence regulation-setting and none of which are 
controlled for (apart from a few cultural variables used in unreported 
regressions), Botero et al. cannot identify the effects attributable 
specifically to legal origins.32  For all the authors’ codificatory 
ambition, the dataset remains ironically impoverished.  This omitted 
variables problem is compounded by the problem of time.  Botero et 
 
 30. The extent to which Botero et al. collaborated with foreign lawyers, labor law scholars, 
or international research bodies is not made clear in the article or the data appendix.  Whatever 
form this collaboration might have taken, one assumes that Botero et al. made all the coding 
decisions themselves.  Enlisting the help of local experts can be an effective, if resource-
intensive, way to help comparative researchers understand foreign legal systems; but it is no 
panacea for measurement error.  See Spamann, supra note 20, at 21 (discussing the benefits and 
drawbacks of cross-country collaboration). 
 31. Cf. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 86, 103 
(2002) (emphasizing the importance of clear coding and data-generation instructions).  Botero et 
al. promise “a full description of all variables and the data” in the online appendix, Botero et al., 
supra note 8, at tbl.1, but the appendix says little on coding and nothing on the data-generation 
process. 
 32. Note in this regard the euphemistic quality of “transplant,” and how the term serves to 
dull and obscure the underlying historical narrative. 
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al.’s cross-sectional approach examines different countries’ regulations 
at a single point in time, 1997, and tells us nothing about how labor 
laws evolve.  This ahistoricity fails to capture any intertemporal 
patterns or fluctuations in the data, and therefore further erodes the 
ability to draw causal inferences.33  Panel data analysis may not have 
been a viable alternative because the fixed effects would have wiped 
out the legal origins results.  But if Botero et al. had run their cross-
sectional regressions for more than just 1997, it would have at least 
shed some light on the results’ sensitivity to the choice of a reference 
year. 
There is, moreover, a problem at the level of theory.  Although 
many hypotheses have been proffered on how different legal 
traditions might influence regulation34—most notably accounts of how 
common law yields more contractarian, less regulated societies—
Botero et al. never actually specify the mechanisms through which 
legal origins determine regulatory outcomes.35  Even more so than the 
typical cross-sectional study, The Regulation of Labor’s results are 
unlikely to be robust to alternative specifications, time periods, or 
explanatory variables. Unadjusted R² values in the 0.19 to 0.64 range, 
trumpeted by Botero et al. in the text, do nothing to allay these 
problems.36 
All of the previous two paragraphs’ criticisms can and have been 
leveled, in scattered form, against these authors’ other legal origins 
research;37 especially acute in The Regulation of Labor, however, is 
 
 33. Imagine, as a hypothetical, that leftist governments worldwide always enact highly 
worker-friendly labor laws, whereas centrist and rightist governments always enact highly 
worker-unfriendly laws.  Now imagine two countries, A and B, where A had a leftist government 
from 1928 to 1990 and then a centrist government afterwards, and B alternated between leftist 
and rightist governments by decade, with rightists regaining power in the 1990s.  Looking at 1997 
labor laws, both A and B appear highly worker-unfriendly.  Not only would Botero et al.’s static 
analysis not capture the evolutionary discrepancies between A’s and B’s labor law systems; it 
would also fail to identify leftist/centrist/rightist government orientation as the causal factor 
driving these systems’ development. 
 34. Botero et al. summarize this literature in the article. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1344–
46. 
 35. Nor do Botero et al. account for the substantial variability in worker protectiveness that 
exists within legal families, as evident from the summary data in Table III.  Italy and Burkina 
Faso, for instance, both have French legal origins, but the former has an aggregate index score 
((0.6499 + 0.6310 + 0.7572) / 3 = 0.68) almost twice as large as that of the latter ((0.4396 + 0.5258 
+ 0.1447) / 3 = 0.37).  Legal origins clearly are not too tight a straightjacket, or the whole story. 
 36. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1365 (describing Table IV, the basic specification). 
 37. See, e.g., Beck & Levine, supra note 11, at 16–20 (summarizing and providing citations); 
Jacoby, supra note 22, at 68–69 (critiquing The Regulation of Labor specifically); Daniel M. 
Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence:  Evidence from Eighteenth 
Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (highlighting problems of theory and 
under-parameterization).  The most dramatic rebuttal belongs to Mark West, who regressed 
countries’ World Cup soccer success against LLSV’s legal origins variables, and found French 
legal origin and antidirector shareholder rights to have statistically significant positive 
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the additional problem of endogeneity.38  Botero et al.’s main findings 
appear in Tables IV and VI, which show that relative to common law 
origins, all other legal traditions have a statistically significant positive 
relationship to worker protection levels on at least one index after 
controlling for GNP per capita and “left power” variables, and in 
Table VIII, which shows a negative, moderately significant 
relationship between worker protection levels and desirable labor 
market outcomes.  There is potential endogeneity here because levels 
of worker protection may influence levels of GNP, left power, and 
labor market outcomes, rather than the other way around.  (Indeed, 
Table VIII broadcasts this possibility by implying that higher levels of 
regulation lead to lower employment and therefore, presumably, to 
lower GNP.)39  Or the variables may jointly determine one another.  
Most of Botero et al.’s legal classifications go back hundreds of years 
to the date of transplant, leaving a vast temporal expense in which 
reciprocal causal iterations could have occurred.  The key parameters, 
 
coefficients, with an adjusted R² value of 0.41.  Mark D. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup 
Success tbl.1 (unpublished manuscript) (2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=318940.  
West’s point, left implicit, was that these are spurious correlations; no one would seriously argue 
that a country’s legal status or shareholder-rights regime determines soccer success.  The causal 
story linking legal origin to current worker-protection levels is admittedly more plausible, but it 
too is severely attenuated. 
 38. Spamann also finds acute endogeneity problems in LLSV’s analysis of shareholder 
protection rules. Spamann, supra note 20, at 28-34, 67. 
 39. In Table VIII, that is, Botero et al. take their article in a different direction, from 
examining the determinants of labor regulations to examining the consequences of labor 
regulations:  “Outcomes,” this section is titled. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1375.  Against 
measures of unofficial economy size, labor force participation, and unemployment (all of which 
Botero et al. concede “have measurement problems,” id.), the authors run OLS regressions with 
only average years of schooling and one of three labor law indices as independent variables.  The 
results vary somewhat across specifications, but in general they show a negative, moderately 
significant relationship between worker protection levels and desirable labor market outcomes, 
with stronger collective relations laws uniquely associated with a larger unofficial economy.  
Unadjusted R² values range from 0.01 to 0.42.  The omitted variables problem is especially acute 
here, amounting almost to misspecification—does anyone believe that average years of 
schooling and a single index of labor laws capture even a fraction of the forces that determine 
labor market outcomes?—and there is a substantial endogeneity concern in that bad labor 
market conditions might stimulate increased labor regulation.  The problem of ahistoricity also 
remains.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  Imagine if Botero et al. had run their cross-
section analysis at a much earlier point in time, say 1900, before any of the relevant labor laws 
and social security programs were in place.  They would still find the common law countries to 
be richer and to have lower unemployment, but the relevance of labor regulation to these 
outcomes would obviously be nil. 
  Overall, Table VIII is too under-parameterized, too half-hearted an effort to offer 
much, and only serves to deflect attention from Botero et al.’s primary arguments on the 
determinants of labor laws.  Its inclusion appears especially odd in light of the great body of 
work that exists on the economic consequences of labor regulation.  See, e.g., Botero et al., supra 
note 8, at 1341 n.2 (citing representative examples); Richard B. Freeman, Labour Market 
Institutions Without Blinders:  The Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11286, 2005) (summarizing the recent 
literature). 
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and the model itself, are left unidentified.  Along with the problems of 
omitted variables, sequencing, and specification, endogeneity makes it 
impossible to know whether legal origin is responsible for, not just 
correlated with, present-day labor law and labor market outcomes. 
The correlations are interesting, however, and in fact represent 
the second major contribution of The Regulation of Labor after the 
dataset itself (assuming it is at least moderately valid).40  In labor law 
as in other areas, the common law tradition again emerges as 
associated with significantly lower levels of regulation.  At the end of 
the article (Table VII), Botero et al. present pairwise correlations 
between their three labor law indices and variables from their prior 
studies reflecting the difficulty of starting a new business and the 
formality of court proceedings.  The correlations are not 
overwhelming, but they are generally positive and statistically 
significant, leading Botero et al. to conclude that “[r]egulatory style is 
pervasive across activities—consistent with the legal theory,” rather 
than a political, economic, or cultural theory of regulatory 
development.41  Although the data concerns outlined in Section I 
demand caution, The Regulation of Labor’s broad results do deepen 
Botero et al.’s descriptive case for regulatory complementarity.42  
Common law origins may not in and of themselves determine today’s 
outcomes, but with each new paper by these authors it becomes 
harder to deny that the common law has a special affinity with more 
informal and efficient regulation. 
III. ON BEING PRODUCTIVELY REDUCTIVE 
The Regulation of Labor’s strengths and weaknesses would be 
notable in their own right, but they are especially notable because 
they illuminate broader issues in these authors’ project and in 
comparative law and economics more generally.  Attempting to 
compare legal provisions and identify causality across numerous 
countries, over numerous years, is extremely difficult to do.  Problems 
with measurement and coding, omitted variables, time sequencing, 
model specification, and endogeneity are endemic to the enterprise.  
That these problems arise so dramatically in The Regulation of Labor 
and its precursors reflects the ambition of the authors.  To investigate 
 
 40. Cf. Ahlering & Deakin, supra note 7, at 25 (“[I]t is . . . possible that the index of Botero 
et al., even based, as it is, on ‘law in the books,’ is a good, working proxy for the social effects of 
laws.  Perhaps more to the point, it is almost certainly the most rigorous and comprehensive one 
that we currently have.”). 
 41. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1375. 
 42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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cross-country structural questions as they do, analytic precision must, 
to an extent, be sacrificed.  By contrast, economists investigating labor 
laws have been able to generate much more robust results when they 
confine themselves to within-country, cross-region variation, and add 
a time-series element.43 
So what usable insights can be gleaned from The Regulation of 
Labor?  For the policymaker, precious few.  The article contains an 
important normative element in its claim that heavier labor regulation 
is associated with lower labor force participation and higher 
unemployment; Table VIII’s prescriptive implications could be 
summed up, it seems, by adding the letters De before regulation in the 
title.44  But Table VIII is the least reliable and least original part of the 
entire study.45  Botero et al. are more suggestive in their examination 
of legal origins.  But even if one believes their causal story and their 
data, it would be enormously costly—in most cases, prohibitively 
costly—to switch legal systems now from, say, civil to common law, 
and nothing in their analysis suggests that such a switchover would 
work. 
For legal scholars, on the other hand, The Regulation of Labor 
holds vast potential.  The study’s sweeping characterization of 
international labor regulations and its demonstration of their legal-
typology correlations can frame almost any comparative labor law 
inquiry.  It is an extreme case of productively reductive research.  
More nuanced comparativists, steeped in the histories and cultures of 
their subjects, have in these authors’ work a reference point that is 
becoming increasingly irresponsible to ignore.  The possibilities for 
fruitful syntheses between this research and more traditional, finer-
grained legal research are endless. 
 
 43. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic 
Performance?  Evidence from India, 119 Q. J. ECON. 91 (2004) (exploring variation across Indian 
states to find that labor regulations have negative effects on employment, investment, and 
productivity in manufacturing); David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and 
Employment:  A Case Study of the Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 772 (1994) (using a comparison with Pennsylvania to find no employment decline 
caused by New Jersey’s minimum wage increase). 
 44. As readers of the Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal are no doubt already 
aware, the issue of labor market deregulation is currently of intense interest in Western Europe.  
Deregulation proposals in France and Germany have sparked heated debates—and, in France, 
general strikes and mass protests.  See Richard Bernstein, Political Paralysis:  Europe Stalls on 
Road to Economic Change, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at A8; David Pozen, Blame It on 
Globalization:  West European Countries Need To Reform Their Welfare Policies for Domestic 
Reasons, YALEGLOBAL, May 21, 2003, available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id= 
1663.  In this sense, Botero et al.’s study appeared on the scene at an auspicious time for 
influencing the policymaking process. 
 45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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The limits of The Regulation of Labor, however, suggest two 
preconditions for this potential to be realized in full.  First, empirical 
legal scholars who create new, non-survey datasets might be 
encouraged to submit them to peer review before publishing analyses 
based on the data.  At present, no such first-order peer review exists.  
To be sure, Botero et al. published their article in a top peer-reviewed 
journal, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and they published an 
earlier version as a National Bureau of Economic Research working 
paper.46  Yet these institutions are set up to vet authors’ manuscripts, 
not necessarily their data collection and coding methods.  (And the 
typical student-run law review is not even set up to do the former 
where sophisticated empirical scholarship is concerned.)  A separate 
body tasked specifically with reviewing datasets in its field could go a 
long way toward rationalizing methodological debates, and would be 
especially valuable when the data span multiple countries, as here. 
A second suggestion is aimed at the level of the author, not the 
academic infrastructure; it concerns presentation.  Deirdre McCloskey 
has, with brilliance and panache, been hammering the point for years 
that despite its trappings of scientific precision, empirical economics 
cannot provide certain answers.47  No one seriously disputes this, but 
rhetorically, McCloskey also highlights, some imply otherwise.48  The 
Regulation of Labor, like other works in La Porta and colleagues’ 
oeuvre, is selectively candid about its vulnerabilities.  The article 
would not leave an untrained reader with the understanding that it 
demonstrates only correlation, never causation, and that even its 
correlations are deeply disputable.  To the contrary, its tone conveys 
authoritativeness—from the conclusion:  “There is, finally, strong 
evidence that the origin of a country’s laws is an important 
determinant of its regulatory approach, in labor as well as in other 
markets. . . . . This evidence is broadly consistent with the legal 
theory”49—while its title, like all the authors’ titles—Law and Finance, 
Legal Origins, The Quality of Government, The Regulation of Labor—
conveys definitiveness, if not closure.  La Porta and colleagues have 
started much, as this paper explains, and they have good reason to 
preen.  But the regulation of labor is a vast subject, and their study 
raises more questions than it answers. 
 
 46. Juan Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 9756, 2003). 
 47. See generally DEIRDRE MCCLOSKEY, THE SECRET SINS OF ECONOMICS (2002); 
DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS (1994). 
 48. See DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (1985); Donald N. 
McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988). 
 49. Botero et al., supra note 8, at 1379. 
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